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Public consciousness, political conscience and memory in 
Latin American nueva canción 
 
Richard Elliott 
 
Introduction 
The nueva canción, or 'new song' movements that emerged in Latin America 
in the 1960s and 1970s, and whose beginnings are normally associated with 
the Chilean Violeta Parra (1917–67) and the Argentinean Atahualpa Yupanqui 
(Héctor Roberto Chavero, 1908–92), have been subject to a significant body 
of scholarly attention (Benmayor 1981; Fairley 1985; Moreno 1986; Morris 
1986; Moore 2003). Much of this literature has focussed on the socio-cultural 
context in which nueva canción emerged and on the lives and works of 
significant figures in the movement, such as Víctor Jara, Inti-Illimani, 
Quilapayún, Patricio Manns, Silvio Rodríguez, Mercedes Sosa, Chico 
Buarque, and Daniel Viglietti. The important role played by such performers 
has consistently been emphasized via collaborations, references, and tributes 
in a sustained process of memory work, consciousness-raising and the 
assertion of a shared history (Elliott 2006; 2008a). In light of the many 
thousands of people in Latin America and beyond for whom these artists have 
acted as 'movement intellectuals' (Eyerman and Jamison 1991), it is 
interesting to consider the role that popular music can play in raising, refining 
or otherwise shaping our awareness of a shared world. 
 
This chapter uses the impact of nueva canción to explore some of the ways in 
which consciousness might be thought of as applying to groups as much as 
individuals. By ‘public consciousness’, I mean those types of shared 
consciousness that go under a variety of epithets such as ‘collective’, ‘mass’, 
and ‘social’. I use the word ‘public’ mainly to highlight the ways in which the 
themes I am interested in are played out in a public sphere connected to 
politics and what I am calling ‘political conscience’, where ‘conscience’ is not 
always easily discernible from ‘consciousness’. This interest in public 
consciousness and conscience emerged from researching issues of music 
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and commitment in Latin America and has been developed as a response to 
those issues. Nueva canción had as one of its guiding themes the quest for 
identity and renewal in the postcolonial Latin American world, and the 
musicians associated with nueva canción act as movement intellectuals in 
raising and focusing consciousness of these processes, and in maintaining 
the relevance of this work in a changing musical world. My case studies here 
are Víctor Jara and Silvio Rodríguez, but I also discuss Ricardo Villalobos, a 
contemporary Chilean DJ who represents a generation of Chileans at one 
remove from the traumas of the previous generation and yet intimately 
connected to them by inherited memory and shared consciousness. If the 
musical agenda of nueva canción, much like the political agendas to which it 
attached itself, was guided by notions of collectivity, then this essay is written 
from a belief that the search for identity inevitably involves a questioning of 
oneself as an individual that can only proceed alongside recognition of oneself 
as definable through one’s relationship to a collective. Along this line of 
thinking, consciousness can only exist via recognition of the Other. 
 
The chapter starts with a discussion of the public nature of consciousness and 
how one might address consciousness (of any kind) epistemologically, 
whether through the brain sciences, psychology, psychoanalysis or 
philosophy. This section is followed by an interpretation of the kinds of 
consciousness involved in the social and political world, paying attention to 
the historical and cultural iterations of consciousness. Discussion of these 
modalities inevitably highlights the gaps between them, but it is not the 
purpose of this essay to attempt to bridge those gaps. Rather, I suggest, via 
reference to the work of Slavoj Žižek, that we should allow these types of 
inquiry to resonate with each other. Having set out a general and theoretical 
contribution to consciousness studies, the chapter then proceeds to a set of 
considerations more clearly located in a specific, ongoing cultural moment, 
that of the nueva canción movement. This moment, also thought of as an 
event, is intended to be read not as an exemplar of ideas in the first part, but 
rather as part of the ground from which they emerge. 
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An epistemological framework 
Although I stress the social here, I do not deny the importance of 
consciousness at the level of the individual. My point, rather, is to highlight the 
necessity of thinking of both together. Consciousness must be thought of as 
social if it is to mean anything beyond an organism’s response to external 
stimuli. Furthermore, when music is brought into relationship with 
consciousness, then social concerns cannot be ignored; music too must be 
thought of as social if it is to mean anything. Defining music provides a 
challenge in that most dictionary definitions require a notion of organization 
that is hard to divorce from the social. A definition such as ‘the combination of 
sounds with a view to beauty of form’ certainly does; ‘sounds in melodic or 
harmonic combination’ perhaps less so.1 It is possible to imagine an isolated 
experience of these sounds, such as an individual alone in a forest 
encountering a pleasing combination of sounds from an unknown natural 
source. But because music derives so much of its meaning from some form of 
social function, our definitions of it have become similarly socialized. To make 
this point is to question whether musical affect can be investigated by 
observing the effects a piece of de-contextualized music has on a similarly de-
contextualized individual, be it my imagined forest dweller or a volunteer 
taking part in a scientific experiment. Granted, an individual taking part in an 
experiment—whether at home or in a lab—is in a context (as is the music he 
or she is listening to or playing), but it is highly unlikely that a context 
organized to map, say, the neurological responses of the individual will 
resemble in any manner a normal listening or playing environment. What this 
discussion highlights is that, traditionally, we seem to be engaging in different 
activities when we discuss consciousness and when we discuss music.2 
There is a tendency to define the former in terms of the individual and the 
latter in terms of the collective.  What I wish to ask here is whether thinking 
about music can help us, through recognition of its very powerful socializing 
processes, to think about consciousness in a manner that reflects the social to 
a greater extent.  
 
At the same time, we should note that it is also difficult to take account of the 
seemingly infinite contexts in which music can be listened to, and that a 
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simplistic recourse to a ‘social context’ may do little better than one that relies 
on the artificially isolated individual. In pursuing the (essentially relativist) logic 
of the myriad potential social contexts in which a musical performance might 
be experienced, we arrive at an equally individualizing process in which each 
individual’s listening or playing experience is so distinct as to make the social 
meaningless again. My response is that the term ‘public’ designates a position 
between these extremes that is provisional but sufficiently quilted—to use a 
term from Lacanian psychoanalysis—to suggest observable phenomena that 
rely on neither of these individualizing moves.3 
 
In a similar fashion, Paul Ricoeur’s discussion of collective memory 
understands the ‘tradition of inwardness’ inaugurated by St Augustine as a 
turning away from the collective, the polis. Ricoeur follows the development of 
this tradition through Locke to Husserl, highlighting the emphasis of these 
thinkers on interiority and reflexivity, but culminating in the problem that ‘the 
entire tradition of inwardness is constructed as an impasse in the direction of 
collective memory’ (Ricoeur 2004: 97). This stumbling block anticipates a 
potential problem in identifying the ‘private’ and the ‘public’. In arguing for an 
emphasis on the collective in its cultural and political realms, am I endorsing 
an Augustinian turn away from the universalizing (i.e. public) work of the brain 
sciences? Or is the paradox already written into the brain sciences and 
medicine in general—that it is necessary to penetrate the most private parts of 
the individual’s body, including its brain, in order to construct a universal 
science of medicine? In related fashion, Ricoeur argues against a polarization 
of phenomenological and neuroscientific methodologies in the study of 
consciousness: 
 
This curiosity [about the brain] is one of the dispositions that articulates 
our relation to the world. The causal dependence in which we find 
ourselves with respect to cerebral functioning, a dependence whose 
knowledge we owe to such curiosity, continues to instruct us, even in 
the absence of suffering due to dysfunction. This instruction helps to 
warn us about the pretentious hubris that would make us the masters 
and possessors of nature. (2004: 423) 
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One of the strengths of scientific enquiry into the relationship between the 
brain and consciousness is that it situates us firmly within the animal world. 
Science can therefore assist in an even more embracing socializing process 
than that which we normally associate with the ‘social’; beyond our 
relationship with other humans lies a social as well as a physical relationship 
with the rest of the natural world. Note the necessity of public consciousness 
for Ricoeur’s point to be thinkable and rhetorically effective: to be aware that it 
is only right to think of humans as animals so as not to have too high an 
opinion of ourselves is to take part in a complex, unavoidably social and moral 
train of thought. 
 
In another account that emphasizes the human animal, Slavoj Žižek 
discusses the ‘problem’ that cognitive science has with the question of 
consciousness. Like Ricoeur, Žižek stresses the need for philosophers to take 
seriously cognitive science’s insight that human perception is always already 
the result of a series of judgements (Žižek and Daly 2004: 54–60). Yet, Žižek 
states, cognitivism cannot show from where in the human the need to know 
emerges; there is always an excess maintained by the very act of asking the 
question. Žižek identifies the central problem of the conflict between 
philosophy, psychoanalysis and cognitivism as consciousness itself, and one 
aspect of the problem resides in asking what consciousness does for us. In 
evolutionary terms, consciousness may have come about in order to enhance 
our awareness of the world around us, but this does not mean that 
consciousness has continued to evolve in response to the increasing 
complexity of human experience; in its emphasis on the role of judgement in 
perception, cognitivism suggests that consciousness is actually a process of 
reducing and abstracting complexity. This being so, it is unclear why 
awareness is needed if consciousness could operate as a blind process 
guiding our perceptions. The enigma, for Žižek, is found in Kant’s question 
why it is that ‘human beings are destined to ask themselves questions which 
they cannot answer’ (2004: 58). Žižek notes Heidegger’s observation that 
‘what characterizes the human being, in the sense of Dasein (being there), is 
that it’s a being that asks questions about its own being, that adopts a self-
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questioning attitude’ (ibid.), and the essential role that philosophy has to play 
in exploring this self-questioning attitude. Psychoanalysis, meanwhile, asserts 
that the gap between subject and subject-as-object is an essential part of 
‘identification and its failure’: it attends to the problem encountered when, to 
use Žižek’s example, an objectivizing biological presentation of a genomic 
formula confronts the subject with the claim that ‘this is you’ (2004: 57). This 
gap, which presents the cognitive sciences with the challenge of finding a 
language that could bridge subject and object, is the raison d’être of 
psychoanalysis. 
 
For Žižek, then, there are two temptations that must be avoided. The first is a 
dismissal of psychoanalysis by a simplistic cognitivist view that sees 
contemporary neuroscientific advances as having superseded earlier naive 
claims; psychoanalysis remains important in dealing with those issues for 
which neuroscience has yet to find a language. The second is a dismissal of 
cognitivism by a transcendental philosophy that would argue that ‘even if they 
find a genetic or neuronal chemical base for neurosis … it still remains a fact 
that we, as speaking human beings, will have somehow to subjectivize it, to 
symbolize it in a certain way, and that this will always be the domain of 
psychoanalysis’ (2004: 60). Symbolization will have to deal with the changes 
and potential trauma wrought by any such self-objectivization. This trauma 
may itself be one of the things that drives the maintenance of human self-
awareness out into the open, into the conscious mind. Developing his own 
version of a line of thought explored by evolutionary cognitivists, Žižek 
suggests that, if we are to think of consciousness in evolutionary terms, we 
should think of it as a ‘mistake’ in which ‘consciousness developed as an 
unintended by-product that acquired a kind of second-degree survivalist 
function’ and that it ‘originates with something going terribly wrong’ (2004: 54–
9). 
 
More recently, Žižek has developed these issues and provided a more 
thorough working-through of the relationship between philosophy, 
psychoanalysis and the brain sciences (Žižek 2006: 147–249). In this account 
we find a return to the notion of a fundamental ‘parallax gap’ that separates 
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psychoanalytic and cognitivist accounts of consciousness. Žižek is still keen 
to avoid the temptations of dismissing one account from the viewpoint of the 
other, but does not believe that the way forward lies in bridging the gap 
between them. Rather, we need to pay more attention to what constitutes the 
gap: ‘What if the actual problem is not to bridge the gap but, rather, to 
formulate it as such, to conceive it properly?’ (2006: 214). Žižek draws here 
on the principle that guides much of his thinking, the notion of a ‘parallax view’ 
produced by examining a problem from differing perspectives. Provided these 
differing perspectives engage thoroughly and effectively with their shared 
subject matter, the difference between them may be reduced, such that only 
the slightest shift in perspective allows for the leap from one to the other. This 
minimal difference does not bring the perspectives together, but marks the 
unbridgeable gap that separates them from each other and recognizes the 
gap as a necessity, not an obstacle. 
 
Throughout his work, Žižek (1989; 2002) has shown the fertile ground to be 
explored by bringing together the work of Hegel, Marx and Lacan, suggesting 
that individual and collective psychologies mirror and feed each other. With 
his continued emphasis on the interaction of consciousness and politics, he 
keeps open the question as to what constitutes materialism. This is important 
because it is precisely around a claim to materialism that some cognitivist 
work attempts to dismiss the tradition of transcendental philosophical 
reflection on the problem of accessing consciousness. Daniel Dennett (1991), 
for example, adopts a position that, while seeming to have a superficial 
correspondence with Žižek’s, makes claims for a quite different kind of 
materialism. Like Žižek, Dennett is suspicious of a too-easy dismissal of 
cognitivism based on its inability to objectivize consciousness completely. But, 
rather than opt for a recognition of the gap separating the different 
perspectives, Dennett claims that anyone who is tempted to look for an 
account of consciousness in places other than those being explored by 
materialist science is contributing to a ‘defeatist thesis’ (1991: 33–42), the 
word ‘defeatist’ seemingly utilized to paint a picture of head-in-the-cloud 
idealists or head-in-the-sand fatalists. I want to stress an equal commitment to 
a materialist theory, but one that can allow itself to consider the political 
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consciousness of a society coming to terms with cultural trauma (Caruth 
1995, Eyerman 2001). Just as science must often put aside questions of faith 
in order to pursue its goals, certain political situations demand a putting-aside 
of the scientific in order to address goals of a more urgently materialist nature. 
Materialism here undergoes a transformation from the realm of scientific 
experimentation to the more easily and effectively collectivized arena of 
cultural exploration and dissemination. To look beyond materialist science for 
explanations of what is happening and what can be done is not to ‘wallow … 
in mystery’ (Dennett 1991: 37) but to recognize that, in redirecting energy 
elsewhere, one might have to resort to notions of faith, ‘necessary illusion’ 
(Anzieu 1990: 95), or even Dennett’s hated ‘dualism’, to get the job done. As 
Jeff Coulter states: 
 
Believing in something … is usually a matter of conviction (religious, 
political, etc.). What one truly believes is a matter of what one says and 
does. Contrary to Dennett, we do not carry our ‘beliefs’ around in the 
neural equivalent of a compartment in our heads, but rather what we 
believe is shown in, displayed by, what we are disposed to say/do and 
what we actually, in relevant circumstances, say/do. (Coulter 2008: 31)  
 
 
 
Awareness and memory 
With the preceding discussion in mind, I suggest a definition of consciousness 
based on various types of awareness: of sensations both immediate and less 
immediate, of data gathered over a period of time. Inevitably, then, I am also 
thinking about the processes of memory on which such consciousness relies. 
The kinds of distinctions I wish to make can be broadly mapped onto those 
found in Walter Benjamin’s work, the first of which is between Gedächtnis and 
Erinnerung. Benjamin's translator Harry Zohn provides a useful defininition of 
the former term as ‘a gathering of unconscious data’ and of the latter as ‘an 
isolating of individual “memories” per se’ (Zohn 2006: 344). The second 
distinction is between Erfahrung, which refers to ‘experience over time’, and 
Erlebnis, which refers to ‘the isolated experience of the moment’ (2006: 345). 
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Awareness gathered over time, thought of as experience and memory, can be 
said to produce consciousness, especially historical, public, or political 
consciousness: it is not until we have lived among people and played a part in 
society that we can truly speak of having this kind of consciousness, and it is 
impossible to imagine being in society without having a sense of public 
consciousness. 
 
For Jacques Lacan, this awareness of ourselves in society comes about with 
our entry into the Symbolic Order, the arena of language and the Law, of the 
methods and rules of communicating with others. It is also where we become 
aware of the imperatives forced upon us by our identification with what Lacan 
calls the ‘big Other’, the universe into which we are thrust: ‘as soon as the 
symbol arrives, there is a universe of symbols’ (Lacan 1991: 29). And, being 
in a universe of symbols, ‘the human order is characterised by the fact that 
the symbolic function intervenes at every moment and at every stage of its 
existence’ (ibid.). While consciousness may not depend on language, our 
access to it does, with the consequence that we cannot speak of 
consciousness or the unconscious outside the Symbolic Order: 
 
If the symbolic function functions, we are inside it. And I would even 
say—we are so far into it that we can’t get out of it ... [W]hen we try to 
... bring order to a certain number of phenomena, first in line being 
those of life, in the end it is always the paths of the symbolic function 
which lead us, much more than any sort of direct apprehension. (Lacan 
1991: 31) 
   
 
The fact that we cannot gain the necessary awareness of ourselves and 
others until we have become subjects of the Symbolic Order distinguishes the 
kind of consciousness I wish to discuss here from other understandings of 
consciousness and awareness: the awareness I am speaking of is one that 
attaches itself to the signifying community and relies on both memory and 
politics. Memory, like consciousness, is something that must be thought of at 
the level of the collective as much as of the individual. As Maurice Halbwachs 
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(1992) observed, memory is most commonly sustained via its social 
dimension, through the processes of recounting to others, receiving others’ 
memories, or being reminded by others. It is these processes that go to make 
up collective memory. James Fentress and Chris Wickham develop these 
ideas in their account of ‘social memory’: 
 
 Social memory is a source of knowledge. This means that it does more 
than provide a set of categories through which, in an unselfconscious 
way, a group experiences its surroundings; it also provides the group 
with material for conscious reflection. This means that we must situate 
groups in relation to their own traditions, asking how they interpret their 
own ‘ghosts’, and how they use them as a source of knowledge. (1992: 
26) 
 
As for the political, we could do worse than remember the post-Hegelian, pre-
Lacanian words of Karl Marx: ‘It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their being, but on the contrary it is their social being that 
determines their consciousness’ (Marx and Engels 1968: 181). 
 
Conscience and consciousness 
Since one aim of my chapter is to bring together the terms ‘consciousness’ 
and ‘conscience’, it is necessary to say a little about the relationship between 
the two. Given the example of Latin American music used below, it is 
important to note that in both Spanish and Portuguese one word is used for 
the two English terms (conciencia (Sp.), consciência (Port.)). I want to hold on 
to this fundamental relationship as sustained in the Romance languages, and 
additionally to think of conscience as a socially evolved form of 
consciousness—one that, perhaps taking account of the ‘mistake’ of 
consciousness, further removes the human from its animal nature. By this I 
mean that the possession by humans of something called ‘conscience’ 
emphasizes a ‘consciousness of being conscious’, a condition far removed 
from consciousness as a blind process functioning alongside other ‘blind’ 
biological processes. Conscience distinguishes itself precisely by its appeal to 
a social contract, which may have its roots in biological necessity, but also 
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seems to exceed biology. Conscience, then, must be part of the Symbolic 
Order and must be distinguished from another of the Lacanian orders, the 
Real. The Real is that which cannot be symbolized and which exists beyond 
our attempts to explain nature; it is ‘raw’ nature itself, that which always 
returns to the same place.4 For our purposes we might distinguish between 
the Real as the biological system in which we might attempt to locate 
consciousness and the Symbolic as the governing principles that dictate how 
we might go about doing so. The Real is that which irrupts into the Symbolic 
as trauma, and the gap between the two orders may only be traversed by 
psychosis or death. Conscience might be thought of as the reminder of that 
gap, the inner voice that charts the distance between the Real and the 
Symbolic. 
 
This proposal calls to mind Lacan’s theory of the role of language and societal 
rules in the process of subjectivization (Lacan 2006: 237–68), with subjectivity 
as the site where the distinction between conscience and ‘bare’ 
consciousness is forged. Louis Althusser (1971), drawing on Lacanian notions 
of identification with the big Other, suggests that subjects identify with 
ideological state apparatuses via a process of interpellation or ‘hailing’, which 
he characterizes ‘along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police 
(or other) hailing: “Hey, you there!”’ (Althusser 1971: 163). We are literally 
called into subjectivity by the voice of the big Other (a voice whose origin we 
cannot locate). Judith Butler’s essay on Althusser, ‘“Conscience Doth Make 
Subjects of Us All”’ (1995), highlights the ways in which Althusser’s theory of 
interpellation relies on subjects already knowing that they will be called to 
account (for themselves), Althusser’s policeman’s hail emphasizing the nature 
of the guilty consciences we carry around with us in our daily lives. 
 
Mladen Dolar, writing of ‘the ethics of the voice’ and ‘the voice of conscience’, 
asks: ‘Given the link between conscience and consciousness (both are modes 
of con-scio), is consciousness about hearing voices?’ (2006: 83). Dolar’s 
question leads in turn to the distinction between hearing and listening, 
analogous to Benjamin’s distinction between Gedächtnis and Erinnerung—
one a largely unconscious process, the other an isolated conscious act. When 
Pre-publication draft of chapter subsequently published in Clarke & Clarke (eds), Music and Consciousness: Philosophical, 
Psychological and Cultural Perspectives (Oxford University Press), pp. 327-41. See published text for correct pagination. 
 
 12 
we speak of something ‘pricking the conscience’, there is a suggestion that 
conscience, though conscious, is nonetheless still subject to the uncontrolled 
forces of the unconscious. Deciding to listen to the heard voices to which 
Dolar refers, with the potential to then act on them, designates the site at 
which conscience leads to agency. 
 
Music of conscience 
Greil Marcus writes of hearing Bob Dylan sing ‘With God on our Side’ in 1963, 
and of being aware of US history being ‘brought back to consciousness’: the 
knowledge of that history was already there but had been forgotten. He 
compares Dylan to someone standing at the edge of a crowd, listening to a 
politician and spreading a rumour that nothing the politician said was true 
(Marcus 2005: 20), and writes of a ‘kind of common epiphany, a gathering of a 
collective unconscious’ in response to ‘Like a Rolling Stone’ in 1965 (2005: 
33). Both examples demonstrate a recognition that what is revealed in the 
epiphanic moment is something that somehow was already known but 
unconscious: it is a becoming-aware in the way that we speak of becoming 
politically aware. 
 
In a similar manner I understand my own musical example, Latin American 
nueva canción, as being deeply engaged with a public consciousness, 
awareness and conscience, as developed in the preceding account. Indeed, 
the term ‘example’ does a disservice by suggesting something tacked on to a 
body of theory, acting only to demonstrate the theory’s worth. But the opposite 
is the case: the music anticipates and invites the theory. I write as someone 
who was interpellated at an early age by the music of Latin America, and in 
particular by the politically committed songs of the Chilean Víctor Jara and the 
Cuban Silvio Rodríguez, and by the equally committed literature of Pablo 
Neruda and Gabriel García Márquez. These artists in turn led me to a 
fascination with the history, culture and politics of Latin America, to the 
academic study of these cultures, and then to firsthand experience. In other 
words, I can trace a growing awareness of this cultural world, a world to which 
there was no inevitability that I would become attracted given my spatial and 
temporal distance from it and its artefacts. That such a process occurred at all 
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attests to the unpredictable potential of a universe of symbols, to the 
possibilities of public consciousness across space and time, and to the role 
played by what Eyerman and Jamison (1991) call movement intellectuals—
those artists, critics and other public figures who disseminate the culture of 
particular social movements to a wider audience. Víctor Jara personifies a 
movement intellectual, as does his widow Joan who told his story to the world 
(Jara 1983), the Chilean record label owner Ricardo Garcia who distributed 
Jara’s banned recordings, and those who performed his music, such as the 
exiled nueva canción groups Quilapayún and Inti-Illimani. Whatever the 
process, for me the music came before the need to ask what it was in the 
music that solicited my identification. Addressing that need by exploring the 
cultural context in which this music continued to operate meant that a 
personal response was transformed into the realization of a collectivity. The 
music connected me as an individual to a network, an imagined community of 
listeners. 
 
It is a common response to the stimulus provided by a musical epiphany to 
search for a narrative that will explain the stimulus. The collective dimension 
of such a phenomenon can involve seeking information in the public domain 
about those responsible for the music, and this is certainly true of the kind of 
politicized music associated with the nueva canción movements that emerged 
in Latin America in the late 1960s. A large part of the meaning of the music 
arguably resides in this publicly disseminated information, in which narratives 
are woven around the lives of musicians, the significance of song lyrics and 
musical instruments, and the political potential of musicians and performers to 
enact change or to assert resistance. Jara, for example, was one of the voices 
most closely associated with the campaign that brought Salvador Allende’s 
socialist Unidad Popular party to power in the 1970 Chilean elections. Jara 
played a decisive role in the development of nueva canción and in its political 
manifestation—with the consequence that he was arrested and subsequently 
murdered by the Chilean army, following the military coup of 11 September 
1973 that brought nearly two decades of dictatorship to Chile. Jara became 
an icon of resistance and his music a form of symbolic exchange among 
those opposed to the dictatorship, his music and that of the other nueva 
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canción musicians representing a beacon of hope, an article of faith that 
change would come. As I have suggested elsewhere (Elliott 2006), the 
messianic aspect of music’s role in heralding change in Latin America cannot 
be overestimated.  
 
The Cuban singer–songwriter Silvio Rodríguez has played a somewhat 
different role from Jara: while he has not always been favoured by the Cuban 
authorities, his music was at least allied to a revolutionary programme that 
was not subsequently overthrown. Rodríguez is associated with a type of new 
song known as nueva trova, which arose contemporaneously with other 
nueva canción movements that were emerging in Latin America. Rodríguez’s 
music, mixing explicit political statements with coded, metaphorical pieces, 
found a receptive audience throughout the Hispanic and Lusophone worlds 
and, in often brutal times—such as during the military dictatorships which 
gripped Argentina and Chile during the 1970s—offered messages of hope 
and remembrance to the victims of oppressive regimes. Rodríguez had visited 
Chile, where his music was to become enormously popular, prior to the 1973 
coup that brought Pinochet to power, and had maintained close links with the 
nueva canción musicians then and subsequently. His return in 1990 for a 
massive concert in Santiago’s National Stadium signified, for many, a return 
to the promise of the Allende years (1970–3) and an end to the official 
silencing of his and others’ music during the intervening period.  
 
A specific song that connects both men and serves as an example of public 
consciousness is Jara's ‘Te recuerdo Amanda’ ('I remember you Amanda'). 
Jara recorded the song in 1969, and it remained a concert favourite for the 
rest of the singer’s life. The lyric describes the relationship between two 
working-class Chileans and the rupture of that relationship in some unwanted 
conflict, making implicit reference to the history of conflicts that had shaped 
life for many generations in Chile and elsewhere in Latin America. The song 
survived the singer, going on to enjoy a busy afterlife, appearing on the 
posthumous collection Manifiesto (1974) with an English translation read by 
Jara’s widow Joan over the late singer's original recording. 'Te recuerdo 
Amanda' was also covered by numerous artists, including Quilapayún, Joan 
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Baez and Robert Wyatt, and Silvio Rodríguez recorded the song in 1998 on a 
tribute album to Jara. The Cuban singer's version is ‘faithful’ to the original in 
the sense in which we often use the word, meaning that it does not depart 
from the original musical boundaries. The differences that emerge are subtle: 
Rodríguez's Cubanising of Jara’s Chilean Spanish; the alternating fragility and 
grit of his vocal on this paean to persistence in the face of adversity; the 
sense that Rodríguez is continuing to engage in the event of remembering 
Jara. 
 
By using the term 'event' in this manner, I deliberately evoke the notion of a 
revolutionary event, something that breaks with the continuum of being and 
suggests new possibilities.5 Such events are both personal and collective and 
demand of those affected by them a severe kind of loyalty or remembering. In 
such a manner, something as seemingly slight as a song—a fragile lament 
such as 'Te recuerdo Amanda'—can grow in stature, becoming a shorthand 
way to connect people in an act of public consciousness. As with its ghostly 
appearance on Manifiesto, where Jara’s voice seems to haunt his wife’s 
reading, 'Te recuerdo Amanda' became a spectral accompaniment to the 
many performances of opposition to the Chilean dictatorship that took place 
during the 1970s and 1980s. As arguably Jara's best-known composition, it 
came to mark both the finality of the singer’s death and the necessity for the 
struggle for democracy to continue. To sing the song was to partake in a 
performative utterance that asserted fidelity both to a large event—the 
opposition to authoritarian terror; and to a smaller or more minor musical 
event—the creation of musical materials and performances associated with 
that opposition.  
 
The artists associated with the first wave of nueva canción, then, have had a 
significant effect on subsequent musicians and audiences, leading to a 
continued fidelity to the causes for which the music helped to raise 
consciousness, and a continued presence in the collective consciousness of 
listeners around the world. The attachment of this music to very particular 
historical events has ensured that the story of those events has continued to 
have a notable presence in the public sphere; in Benjamin’s terms, a series of 
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isolated experiences of particular moments (Erlebnis) result in a long 
experiential process (Erfahrung). Musicians and other artists have been at the 
centre of the dissemination of information regarding events in Latin America. 
Many were among the waves of exiles who fled the most brutal regimes and 
who brought their stories and music to other parts of the world, helping to form 
an international network of consciousness about what was occurring back 
home. 
 
Altered consciousness 
If consciousness studies has shown an interest in the effects of drug-induced 
altered states of consciousness on music (see chapters by Fachner and 
Shanon, this volume), we might ask why such altered states are mostly seen 
to concern transformations of the immediate perception of individuals, 
understood from the perspective of chemical changes in their brains. It is 
equally the case that we never hear any piece of music the same way twice, 
that we always bring something new and different to it, and that these 
differences can arise as much from to the impact of history, culture and 
politics as of mind-altering drugs. History, culture and politics are states that 
are constantly being altered too, even as we attempt to stabilize them, and 
one less obvious way to think about altered states of consciousness might be 
to think about changes wrought by and upon the political state. 
 
Often associated with decadence and hedonism, dance music seems to 
embody a central tenet of much popular music, where the music and the act 
of listening emphasize the present. Yet, as much as pop may seem to accept 
the inevitability of transience, there remain strands of popular music that do 
not wish to forget and that do not always allow for the easy loss of self. An 
interesting example of this is offered by Philip Sherburne (Sherburne 2007), 
who describes watching Chilean techno artist Ricardo Villalobos DJing at the 
2005 MUTEK festival in Chile. The effectiveness of the story Sherburne tells 
relies on recognizing the Chilean folk singer Violeta Parra (the ‘mother of 
nueva canción’) as an embodiment of the aspirations of the country in the 
period prior to Pinochet’s 1973 coup: 
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A few hundred rather messy-looking ravers danced and cavorted while 
a few dozen Chileans and their families looked down on us from the 
promenade with a mixture of curiosity and middle-class disdain. And 
then it happened: out of the matrix of pulses, a voice unfurled like some 
exotic flower. It was Violeta Parra’s song, gently remixed by Villalobos 
to nestle comfortably with the rest of the mix. As the music fell away, 
we were left only with her unmistakable voice, which traversed an eerie 
modal scale that seemed, at least to a foreigner, not Chilean, not Latin 
American, but simply and terrifyingly otherworldly. Up on the 
promenade, though, the song’s provenance dawned on the passers-by, 
and their expressions changed. Jaws dropped. Time stopped. A 
wormhole had appeared—both for the ravers dancing in suspended 
animation but also, more importantly, for the uninitiated spectators who 
found themselves transported to a year before the dictatorship, before 
economic restructuring, before the Internet. Villalobos was working his 
magic, cheating the clock at 128 bpm. (Sherburne 2007: 33) 
 
 
Sherburne neglects to mention that the song that Villalobos uses is ‘Santiago 
penando estás’ (Parra 1999), notable among other reasons for the instrument 
on which Parra chose to accompany herself: an Andean bass drum called the 
bombo (she accompanied most of her songs with guitar). The bombo provides 
a dull thudding beat and is the only instrument other than Parra’s voice on her 
recording of the song. In Villalobos’s set all sounds are removed at the point 
where he inserts ‘Santiago penando estás’—except for Parra’s voice and a 
beat which, while sounding like the generic bass beat of contemporary dance 
music, echoes the sound of the bombo to such an extent that it is impossible 
to tell how much (if any) of the beat has been sampled from the original, how 
much has been added in the mix, and whether the purpose was to cover the 
original sound, evoke Andean tradition, or just keep the beat going at this late 
stage in a four-hour set.6 This ambiguity provides another level of connection 
between the original song and its present incarnation, emphasizing the 
timelessness that Sherburne finds in this sonic event. Villalobos, it appears, is 
attempting a strategy of estrangement in which he dislocates his auditors both 
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spatially and temporally while dancing is displaced by remembering. The point 
may not even be the historical specificity of Parra’s music, important as that 
is—as is borne out by Villalobos’s use of Parra’s voice in sets that he 
produces in other parts of the world where his listener/dancers may have no 
knowledge of the voice’s provenance. Even at MUTEK, the specifics of the 
memory may not be translatable; but the pointer towards an act of 
remembrance is recognized because the strategy of estrangement has 
brought about an act of remembering, albeit a remembering that is an attempt 
to figure out just what is going on (when confused, it is to our memory as 
much as any other ‘sense’ that we turn). As Pierre Nora writes in regard to 
official silences, ‘the observance of a commemorative minute of silence, which 
might seem to be a strictly symbolic act, disrupts time, thus concentrating 
memory’ (Nora and Kritzman 1996: 14).  
 
There is no certainty that those observing the silence are remembering the 
same thing. In Villalobos’s time-‘cheating,’ as in officially-endorsed public 
silences, we can expect that ‘normal’ time will resume: the beat kicks back in, 
the dancing resumes, and a sort of ‘normality’ returns. For, while Sherburne’s 
point seems to be that, by keeping the music at 128 bpm throughout his sets, 
Villalobos is attempting to sustain a ‘time out of joint’ for as long as possible, 
and it is easy to see how this time becomes a new kind of normality once the 
DJ’s listener/dancers have adjusted their mental clocks. To finish his set with 
the Parra tribute would be to leave these listeners stranded; it is the silence 
and uncanniness surrounding Parra’s voice emerging from the mix that is the 
really ‘out of joint’ aspect of time at work here, not the ‘homely’ (‘housely’?) 
music with which Villalobos frames it. Perhaps it is not important what is 
remembered—and yet the point of telling the story (Sherburne’s point) is to 
say that it does matter.  
 
I find Sherburne's narrative convincing precisely because of my own 
experience of nueva canción and because I am engaged in researching these 
kinds of responses to music and memory. While I can see such responses as 
highly subjective, I can also determine a loose community of ‘believers’ 
(among whom I count myself) who find in this kind of discourse a useful way 
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to account for the effect that music has on them. Music has sent out a call, 
interpellating listeners who then attempt to account for their identification with 
music. This inevitably involves telling stories, weaving narratives around the 
musical materials, creating (auto)biographies and histories that interlace 
personal and public reminiscences. Public consciousness requires 
publicists—interpreters who will take part in the dissemination of cultural 
artefacts (Marcus for Dylan, Joan Jara for Víctor, Sherburne for Villalobos). To 
criticize the use of personal reminiscences by highlighting their subjective 
specificity is to ignore the fact that memory is a process we share with others 
and that memory (per se) is nothing without (particular) memories.7  
 
Conclusion 
I have argued in this chapter for the importance of a sense of public 
consciousness. Rather than seeing music as merely an example of this, I 
have argued that music interpellates its audience—issues an invitation to 
discuss the public dimension of consciousness. My proposal arises from two 
distinct but related responses. The first is prompted by the absence in 
cognitivist accounts of consciousness of a convincing exploration of history, 
politics or society. The second is my response to the call of a music (nueva 
canción) that demands such an account. Behind both lies the key issue of 
identification, by which I mean both the construction of identity as one 
develops subjectivity and identification with a musical culture. This suggests 
that psychoanalysis and phenomenology still have much to say about 
consciousness. 
 
If nueva canción exemplifies the functioning of a public consciousness, the 
ways in which it is appropriated by subsequent generations may challenge as 
much as extend the practical uses of its political potential. There would of 
course be other ways to interpret my use of Sherburne’s account of 
Villalobos’s sampling of Violeta Parra (and the abundance of possessives 
highlights both the fragility and the continuity of the chain). One might wish to 
focus instead on the role of dance music in altering the consciousness of the 
individual, and I have already indicated above some of the directions in which 
such an account might proceed. The question would seem to hinge on the 
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importance we give to interpretation (and to interpreters) when evaluating 
what ‘goes into’ consciousness—an issue vividly discussed by Heidegger in 
his essay ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’: 
 
We never really first perceive a throng of sensations, e.g. tones and 
noises, in the appearance of things … rather we hear the storm 
whistling in the chimney, we hear the three-motored plane, we hear the 
Mercedes in immediate distinction from the Volkswagen. Much closer 
to us than all sensations are the things themselves. We hear the door 
shut in the house and never hear acoustical sensations or even mere 
sounds. In order to hear a bare sound we have to listen away from 
things, divert our ear from them, i.e. listen abstractly. (Heidegger 1993: 
151–2) 
 
To understand the ‘Villalobos narrative’ through a cognitivist account of 
listening in an altered state among consumers of dance music, might be 
valid—another step in the dialectic, perhaps—but would also be to ‘listen 
away’ from the interpretation of this particular music that Sherburne presents. 
That is something I would want to resist, since it represents an attempt to 
‘bridge the gap’ and solve what may be fundamentally unsolvable differences 
between philosophy and neuroscience. The gap may be more productively 
pursued by attending to, but maintaining, that minimal difference that is forced 
upon the observer by Žižek’s parallax view. 
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1 These definitions are taken from The Compact Edition of the Oxford English 
Dictionary (1971), pp. 1880-1. 
2 This may be less the case when thinking of music in the circumstances of 
musical analysis, in which there is also the tendency for music to be de-
contextualized. 
3 I am referring here to what Lacan calls the point de capiton, translated as 
either ‘quilting point’ or ‘anchoring point’. In its literal use this point designates 
a site where the otherwise shapeless mass of stuffing is fixed in place by an 
upholsterer’s needle; in its metaphorical use it designates a site where an 
otherwise chaotic mass of meaning can be fixed into an isolated sensible 
form. For Lacan, it is ‘the point of convergence that enables everything that 
happens in … discourse to be situated retroactively and prospectively’ (Lacan 
1993: 268). 
4 Dylan Evans (2001: 159-60) defines the Real as follows: 'the real emerges 
as that which is outside language and inassimilable to symbolisation ... This ... 
leads Lacan to link the real with the concept of impossibility. The real is ... 
impossible to imagine, impossible to integrate into the symbolic order, and 
impossible to attain in any way'. 
5 I also deliberately evoke the work of Alain Badiou, whose theory of 'event' I 
have elsewhere connected with the performance of popular music (see Elliott 
2006; Elliott 2008a: 159-211, Elliott 2008b). 
6 These observations are based on MP3 versions of Villalobos’s sets posted 
to the internet in 2007, now no longer available. 
7 See Coulter (2008: 20) on the ‘globalization of Memory’ engendered by 
cognitivism. This is an area provocatively explored in Edward Casey’s (2000) 
attempt to create a ‘phenomenology of memory’, and also developed by 
Lambek (1996) and Ricoeur (2004) to account for the ways memory is used to 
write history. Sherburne’s account, when read alongside Ricoeur’s interactive 
process of memory/history/forgetting, is one in which ‘memory’ and ‘state’ 
become historically meaningful.  
 
